Wilsonian Idealist

The other day, I sat down virtually with Douglas Anderson, Research Editor at Dow Jones, to discuss how shifting geopolitical dynamics and intensifying great-power competition in Central Asia are shaping Kazakhstan’s foreign and defense policies, with a particular focus on China’s growing security presence in the region.

Kazakhstan’s Dangerous Dependence on China? | Episode 1, Wilson Talks:
https://youtu.be/6M9nbZeRd2A

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

Recently, I have been reading analyses and posts on Central Asia and regional interrelationships by local analysts, government officials, and journalists. Based on these readings, I have noticed three evolving trends:

1. Many opinions and arguments appear to be shaped by wishful thinking. They tend to simplify the region’s complex intra-regional relationships and its relations with the great powers, while employing broad and sometimes ambiguous concepts that obscure rather than clarify the realities they seek to explain.

2. A considerable part of the analytical discourse consists of different interpretations of research and analysis originally produced by someone else. If one reads five pieces on the same subject, it is not uncommon to encounter essentially the same arguments expressed in different forms. This raises a broader question about the extent to which the region is producing original analytical frameworks rather than reproducing established interpretations.

3. More recently, analysts and government officials have begun to emphasize the leadership of individual regional states on particular issues. In my view, this is significant because it introduces a different dimension into the discussion: not simply whether Central Asian states cooperate, but which states are capable of shaping the regional agenda and speaking on behalf of the region. This may signal the beginning of a broader analytical discourse on regional leadership.

Taken together, these trends suggest a growing focus on regional agency and leadership, but the quality of this discourse will depend on moving beyond established narratives toward the underlying interests and power dynamics of the region.

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

The other day, I had a conversation with several Jackson School students about China and the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan. One of my fellow students argued that "...China would invade [T]aiwan within the next two years..." I strongly disagreed with this assessment and presented several counterarguments, which led him to reconsider his position.

In the immediate and short term, I believe it is unlikely that China will conduct a military operation against Taiwan for several reasons:

(i) The changing character of warfare and the lessons of Russia’s losses in Ukraine. When Russia began its military operation in Ukraine, there were numerous analyses suggesting that Moscow would conquer Kyiv within two weeks, one month, or by 9 May, among other predictions. In reality, Russia’s attempts to establish air dominance and its extensive use of costly missiles have been counterbalanced by Ukraine’s use of relatively inexpensive drones, among other capabilities, which has contributed to prolonging the conflict. China will therefore likely spend the coming years studying both theoretically and practically the changing character of warfare, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine as well as conflicts in the Middle East. Meaning that Beijing would likely seek to incorporate these lessons into its military planning and reduce uncertainty before undertaking such a costly operation.

(ii) The complexity of amphibious warfare. Amphibious assaults are among the most difficult and complex military operations to conduct. A successful operation against Taiwan would require a high degree of superiority in both the maritime and air domains, as well as the ability to sustain that superiority throughout the operation. The Taiwan Strait itself presents significant geographical and operational challenges. Achieving this on the battlefield requires formidable military capabilities which, in my opinion, China has not yet demonstrated to a sufficient degree for such an operation. More importantly, China would have to conduct such an operation under conditions of serious resistance and potentially significant external involvement, particularly from the United States and possibly Japan. This uncertainty provides another reason for Beijing to be cautious about initiating such an operation in the immediate term.

(iii) The realist understanding of war and great-power behavior. From a realist perspective on international relations, great powers understand the enormous costs and uncertainties associated with war. War is inherently destructive and can produce unintended consequences that are difficult to control. Consequently, great powers are more likely to initiate war when they believe that the probability of achieving their objectives is sufficiently high and that the potential costs and risks are manageable. In the case of Taiwan, the potential costs of a failed or prolonged invasion would be enormous, including military losses, economic disruption, sanctions, and potentially direct confrontation with the United States and its allies.

I am not arguing that China will never invade Taiwan or conduct a military operation against it. Rather, based on the arguments above, I believe that such an operation is highly unlikely in the immediate and short term. Nevertheless, predicting future international events is inherently difficult.

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

Finally, after more than a year of waiting, our analytical piece, “Mapping Central Asia’s Security Shift: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Re-Export of Dual-Use Goods Between China and Russia,” has been published by CAPS Unlock as part of its “Selected Papers from the CAPS Unlock China-Central Asia Research Initiative 2025” program.
The report examines the role of Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the re-export of dual-use goods from China to Russia following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and explores the implications for the region’s broader security posture.

The findings highlight three critical dynamics:
(i) China’s expanding economic and security footprint in Central Asia has positioned the region as an important intermediary in Russia’s supply chains;
(ii) incomplete regulatory frameworks and limited enforcement capacity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan create opportunities for illicit re-exports; and
(iii) the region’s multi-vector diplomacy exposes Central Asian states simultaneously to Western scrutiny, Russian influence, and Chinese leverage.

For Central Asian states, the challenge is to balance economic interests with international obligations and strengthen export-control mechanisms. For external actors, the task is to engage Central Asia constructively in improving these regimes rather than relying primarily on punitive measures.

Grateful to everyone who contributed to this project and supported us throughout the long publication process.
Douglas Anderson Tlegen Kuandykov Azimzhan Khitakhunov

Disclaimer: The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent any affiliated institution or organization.

Link: https://capsunlock.org/publications/selected-papers-from-the-caps-unlock-china-central-asia-research-initiative-2025/

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

After reading scholarly articles on regional hegemony and middle powers, I have come across two questions:

• First, how would the theory of regional hegemony apply to Central Asia? Would Central Asia be considered a distinct region in which regional hegemony could emerge, or should it instead be understood as part of a broader Eurasian strategic region?

• Second, how should we conceptualize “middle powers”? Should we see them as a distinct category between major and minor powers, or as a relational category, such that a state could be considered a major power in one context but a middle power relative to a great power?

In his latest article, “The Iron Cage of International Anarchy,” John Mearsheimer argues that a state’s position as a great, major, or minor power is primarily determined by its relative military capabilities. Great powers possess sufficient military capabilities to put up serious resistance against the world’s most powerful state in an all-out conventional war. Major powers can initially offer serious resistance but would ultimately lose in a prolonged war of attrition. Minor powers, by contrast, lack the military capabilities to offer serious resistance even at the beginning of such a conflict.

This raises a further question: where, within Mearsheimer’s framework, should middle powers be placed? Are they a distinct category based on a particular level of military capability, or is “middle power” a relational concept that depends on the state against which its capabilities are being assessed?

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

Our analytical piece, coauthored with my friend and colleague Douglas Anderson, titled “Between Moscow and Beijing: Evolving Security Dynamics in Central Asia,” has been published by Eurasia Review.

The piece examines China’s growing security role in Central Asia through military technology exports, joint military exercises, security-oriented investment, and emerging cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and 5G. It argues that while Russia remains an important security actor, its reduced power projection and declining arms exports have enabled Beijing to assume a more prominent role in Central Asian security. China’s expanding presence also increasingly links economic engagement with security cooperation, creating durable relationships with regional governments.

The piece concludes that Central Asian governments can continue pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy in the near term, but deepening Chinese economic and security ties may gradually shift the regional balance toward Beijing. These developments also have important implications for Western engagement with Central Asia.


More: https://www.eurasiareview.com/11082026-between-moscow-and-beijing-evolving-security-dynamics-in-central-asia-analysis/

@wilsonian_idealist | Sardor Allayarov

Of course, be sure that it is not for iPhone 17 Pro Max Silver | 1 TB 😁🥂

The other day, Otabek Akromov, PhD researcher at ANU, wrote a post titled “ https://t.me/otabek_akromov?” In it, he emphasized that most research in the region follows a similar path—analyzing bilateral or multilateral state relations as case studies. While acknowledging the importance of such studies, he argued that they rarely contribute to theory-building in international relations.

When I was a graduate student in 2021, I reached a similar conclusion. I rarely encountered scholars in Uzbekistan or Central Asia who focused on theories of international relations. This motivated me to study IR theory more seriously, and I wrote my graduate dissertation titled “World Order and Problems of Peace in the Post–Cold War Period.” Using a realist framework, the thesis contributed to the existing literature by offering a detailed comparative analysis of U.S.–China–Russia dynamics and their implications for global peace.

In addition, I later authored a paper titled “The Great Recession and International Economic Order: Insights from Global Economic Crises.” The article challenges the common assumption that economic recessions automatically lead to the emergence of new world orders. Instead, it argues that changes in the global economic structure depend on whether leading powers succeed or fail in stabilizing the system. In this sense, the article makes a modest but genuine theoretical contribution by refining the relationship between global economic crises and international order change.

As my professor László Gulyás once noted, writing a theoretical piece takes time and maturity; it requires extensive reading across multiple disciplines to explain why states behave and act in particular ways.

P.S.: I learned a great deal from Otabek Akromov regarding applications and scholarships.